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1 Introduction 
 
The multilateral trade system especially that of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), is in a state of flux.1 This is mainly because of the decade-long Doha Round 
of trade negotiations, which cannot be concluded. Many of its participants are 
frustrated2 and it has been stated that there is an institutional crisis.3 As a 
consequence, the WTO is increasingly becoming a bystander as the world's 
economic powers ignore the global talks and pursue their own bilateral and regional 
trade pacts.4 Trying to reach an agreement has been very difficult.5 The global 
economic crisis has dampened the appetite of major role players to end the impasse. 
The crisis has also eroded the strength of the historical superpowers, the Unites 
States of America and Europe, who are no longer considered leaders of the 
multilateral trading system. Instead there is a steady rise to power by emerging 
economies, especially those of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. These 
countries form the now familiar BRICS front and are now considered future 
economic powerhouses that can contribute to the construction of a new international 
architecture.  
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1  Dube Way Forward for the WTO 5. 
2  Odell "Growing Power" 7. 
3  Jones Doha Blues 1-21. 
4  Anonymous 2013 online.wsj.com. 
5  See generally Martin and Messerlin 2007 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 347‐366. 
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Multilateral trade-related decisions continue to be made in smaller forums and not in 
the Doha Round, which includes all the members of the WTO. Regional trade 
agreements and bilateral trade agreements are accordingly referred to as chief 
adversaries since they continue to pose the ever-present challenge of fragmentation. 
Members of the WTO also continue to use other mechanisms like regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) to fill the trade gaps left by multilateralism. The Doha Round 
impasse may be said to signal a crisis in the WTO and to point to the need for broad 
institutional reform.6 The areas that require reform are mainly those related to the 
decision-making processes, which are critical because they are intrinsically linked to 
the legitimacy of the institution.7 The Doha Round had been earmarked as a 
'development round' whose focus is on the developing countries.8 However, its 
success depends on the reform called for in this contribution.9 The following key 
areas of the WTO decision-making mechanism appear to require urgent reform: 
 
1. Consensus decision-making 
2. The WTO as "a single package" 
3. The WTO as a member-driven organisation 
4. Special and differential treatment for "developing countries" 
5. The WTO as "hard law", subject to compulsory dispute settlement 
 
An analysis of these areas is necessary to ascertain their current value in the 
decision-making processes of the WTO. Linked to this, is the question how these 
areas of decision-making can be reformed for the benefit of new-generation trade 
architecture, especially processes dictated by the current influence of the developing 
countries. The GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) has a good track 
record but its successor, the WTO, is failing.10 And all the members of BRICS are 
signatories to the WTO agreement. The analysis is even more relevant when one 
considers that the BRICS countries have not signed a legally binding agreement to 
regulate their relations. The BRICS arrangement is committed to support an open 
                                                 
6  Ismail 2009 World Economics 109‐146. 
7  Dube Way Forward for the WTO 2. 
8  Deardorff and Stern 2003 fordschool.umich.edu 12. 
9  Steger 2009 J Int'l Econ L 803-833. 
10  Collier 2005 users.ox.ac.uk 1423-1449. 
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and rules-based multilateral system embodied in the WTO. The BRICS arrangements 
will for example have to utilise the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in the event 
of a dispute. Thus, a successful, comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the 
Doha Development Agenda (the DDA) would be in the best interests of BRICS and 
other like-minded organisations. 
 
2 Historical background 
 
The WTO is a treaty-based organisation that is charged with the supervision and 
liberalisation of international trade. Its main function is to ensure and guarantee that 
trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.11 The creation of the 
WTO can be seen as one dimension of the gradual process of global liberalisation of 
trade.12 This organisation started off as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1947 but was transformed into the WTO on January 1, 1995 under the 
Marrakech Agreement. The GATT started operating in 1948 and, at the time, 
negotiations primarily involved three parties: the European Community (EC), the 
USA and Japan.13 Some have described these parties as a club for the rich only.14 
This may however not have been a true reflection of the world economy at the time 
since Japan's economy was struggling and today the organisation's membership now 
stands at 153. It is the mandate of the WTO to deal with the regulation of trade 
between participating countries, providing a framework for negotiating and 
formalising trade agreements, and providing a dispute resolution process aimed at 
enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements. These agreements are signed 
by representatives of member governments after the process of accession by each 
of the prospective members. The agreements also need to be ratified by these 
member governments' parliaments. Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on 
derive from previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986–
1994). 
 
                                                 
11  See WTO Date Unknown www.wto.org. 
12  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 2. 
13  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 2. 
14  See generally Lawrence 2006 J Int'l Econ L 823‐835. 
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The WTO is currently preoccupied with attempts to complete negotiations on the 
Doha Development Round, which was launched in 2001 with an explicit focus on 
addressing the needs of developing countries.15 However, currently the future of the 
Doha Round remains uncertain with almost all the items on the agenda having 
missed their deadlines. The deadline for the 21 subjects listed on the work 
programme has been missed. The deadline was set for 1 January 2005, so the 
completion of the Round is long overdue. The main challenges centre on free trade 
in industrial goods and services. The greatest interest for the developing countries is 
the retention of protectionism, which takes the form of farm subsidies paid to the 
domestic agricultural sector by the developed nations, especially the EU. Agricultural 
subsidies continue to distort trade, especially for the poor countries.16 These 
subsidies have alienated the developing countries, who are pushing for the swift 
move to fair trade in agricultural products. This remains a major obstacle to the 
conclusion of the Round. Agriculture is a key area for developing countries, since 
most of them are becoming increasingly competitive in the agricultural and value-
added processed food products sectors. This point of contention has prevented any 
progress from being made to launch new WTO negotiations beyond the Doha 
Development Round. As a result, an increasing number of bilateral free trade 
agreements and cooperation arrangements have been signed as mentioned before. 
 
There were several rounds of trade negotiation under GATT and one since the 
formation of the WTO. The Doha Round is the current WTO trade round. The 
challenge related to the time it takes to complete a round is not unique to the Doha 
Round. Even the Uruguay Round took nearly a decade to complete, which suggests 
a stagnant and outdated decision-making system in serious need of reform.17 The 
increasing popularity of regional and bilateral trade agreements, and with these the 
continued erosion of the rules underpinning the multilateral trading system, are 
indicative of the WTO members' frustrations with the latter. However, the decision-
making mechanism cannot be reviewed in the midst of a trade negotiation round, so 
change can happen only after the conclusion of the current round of trade 
                                                 
15  Deardorff and Stern 2003 fordschool.umich.edu 12. 
16  Panagariya 2005 World Economy 1277-1299. 
17  Dube Way Forward for the WTO 6. 
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negotiation. The reform required is threefold: the rulemaking and decision-making 
processes need reconsideration, as do the management of day-to-day activities and 
the enforcement of negotiated commitments and rules.18  
 
3 The global financial crisis and multilateral trade governance 
 
The global financial crisis has had an impact on global trade.19 A lot of tension was 
generated by the impact of exchange rate management on trade.20 Even though the 
International Monetary Fund (the IMF) is chiefly responsible for exchange rate 
regimes and financial deleverages, the global trading system was affected 
negatively.21 In this context, the WTO cannot spread its influence too far. Thus, it 
created an opportunity for the emerging economies, especially the BRICS countries. 
In this way these emerging economies have become active in decision-making at the 
WTO. The distribution of political and economic power still plays an integral role in 
shaping the agenda of trade negotiations.22 The Chinese economy has, for example, 
helped in the economic recovery of both the USA and Europe. At the same time, the 
experience has helped developing countries to organise and galvanise each other 
into interest-based coalitions, mainly based on defensive interests that are designed 
to better gain market access to developed countries.23 The BRICS countries, 
especially China, have also taken advantage of their massive markets to influence 
global trade flows. With all the BRICS countries being part of the WTO, it is expected 
that the status quo will have to change; no more will the developed countries in 
multilateral trade establishments be the only drivers of multilateral negotiations.24 
However, a strong presence of the developing economies' coalition in the WTO is yet 
to be seen and experienced. Even among the developing countries themselves, it 
remains to be determined how development principles can be applied effectively in 
                                                 
18  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 1-28. 
19  Auboin Restoring Trade Finance 16. 
20  Draper Whither the Multilateral Trading System? 5-12. 
21  Draper Whither the Multilateral Trading System? 5-12. 
22  Baldwin 2009 onlinelibrary.wiley.com 29. 
23  Baldwin 2009 onlinelibrary.wiley.com 29. 
24  Warwick Commission Multilateral Trade Regime. 
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the WTO, in line with countries' diverse definitions of development and in a manner 
that would best satisfy all members' expectations. 
4 Current state of affairs 
 
At the time of our writing this contribution, the WTO had just appointed Roberto 
Azevêdo, the Brazilian career diplomat, as new Director-General. The incumbent 
Pascal Lamy's term is running out and he is not available for another term. That in 
itself means the organisation will be without an experienced leader to take the Doha 
Round forward, especially considering that Azevêdo has been accused of scuttling 
the Round.25 He has been Brazil's Chief Negotiator for the Doha talks and many fear 
he will try to impose Brazil's protectionist model on world trade. Brazil's remains one 
of the most protected economies in the Americas.26 The new Director-General will 
need to hit the ground running. This will not be easy under the current 
circumstances of the Doha Round, which has been in progress for more than a 
decade. The Round remains in limbo and with it, the multilateral system.27 The 
current global economic crisis also means that the major economies of the globe are 
in the process of prioritising the reparation and recovery of their domestic 
economies. This has also freed some policy space for developing countries to 
determine the new course the world economy will take. 
 
It is no wonder that developing countries, especially the emerging economies, are 
pushing for self-reliance through initiatives like the expected launch of the BRICS 
bank. The BRICS countries are on the verge of starting a development bank that 
seeks to wean their economies from relying on the Bretton Woods institutions like 
the World Bank and the IMF. The bank will also have its own currency. This bank will 
have a ripple effect on world trade. For instance, the currency of trade among the 
five BRICS countries will no longer be the American dollar. This means that the 
predominance of the US dollar in global trade may soon be a thing of the past. If the 
                                                 
25  Anonymous 2013 online.wsj.com. 
26  Anonymous 2013 online.wsj.com. 
27  Dube Way Forward for the WTO 7. 
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BRICS bank is successful, it will be logical for most developing countries to adopt the 
BRICS currency.28 
 
This current state of affairs makes it very difficult for WTO members to reach 
decisions and the Doha Round has fallen victim to this complex new world order. 
Hoekman identifies three areas that require reform as a result of the status quo: 
rulemaking and decision making, the management of day-to-day activities, and the 
enforcement of negotiated commitments and rules.29 The likelihood of the much 
needed reform happening in the middle of negotiating a trade round is very unlikely. 
However, this does not discount the strong sentiments calling for reform of the 
WTO. The hope is that the members of the WTO will be able to finalise the Doha 
Round and move forward. Reform may then be prioritised to ensure an efficient and 
more transparent WTO. Henceforth we focus on the priority areas that we perceive 
to be in need of institutional change. 
 
5 Consensus decision-making 
 
Consensus is the primary method of decision-making in the WTO. Voting is the 
secondary method that can be resorted to in the event of the failure of consensus.30 
Voting is technically possible in the WTO but in practice does not occur.31 Consensus 
is very important in the multilateral trading system and is the key to WTO decision-
making. Nothing is decided on unless there is consensus. In the history of the WTO, 
voting has been resorted to only once – during the accession of Ecuador in 1995.32 
By way of operation, and according to the Marrakesh Agreement a decision is made 
'if there is no objection by member/s present at the meeting when such decision is 
taken'. A presumption of consensus is also created in the absence of 'formal 
objection when matters come up for decision'. There is a need to ascertain whether 
'consensus' in its current form is applicable in the WTO of today and other forums 
like BRICS. It is naturally going to be easy to establish consensus in BRICS since 
                                                 
28  Anonymous 2012 rt.com. 
29  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 1-28. 
30  See Article IX:2 of the World Trade Organisation Agreement (1994). 
31  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 1-28. 
32  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 1-28. 
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there are only five countries involved. Consensus recorded much success under the 
initial GATT, where consensus succeeded mainly because of the desire for trade 
liberalisation. The major role players, like the USA, EU and Japan, were key 
liberalisers.33 In total, the founders of GATT were 23 capitalist technocrats whose 
like-mindedness made it possible to realise a common goal. Trade liberalisation was 
strongly linked to reciprocity and an understanding that the reduction of tariffs by 
member states was for mutual benefit.34 In addition, most of the developing 
countries had just become independent and were satisfied with their WTO 
membership without having any strong interest in what was going on. At most, 
independent African countries identified with their former colonial masters; hence 
decisions were taken in their support. Thus, the context of consensus under GATT 
was very different from its context under the WTO. 
 
Furthermore, consensus was more appropriate to GATT than to the WTO, since 
GATT was characterised as a type of gentleman's club whose main purpose was to 
settle trade problems rather than to clarify trade law.35 It has been stated also that 
the main intention under GATT was never to create a rigid rule book, but to adopt a 
flexible regime of economic and political realities that would evolve over time.36  
 
5.1 What is consensus as an international norm? 
 
Consensus is generally a decision-making process that involves seeking to consider 
the views of all parties concerned.37 It includes a process of reconciling any 
conflicting arguments. This makes consensus decision-making silent on the eventual 
voting or decision-making rule. Consensus can be applied by establishing unanimity, 
which could also be unanimity minus one or two members. It could also be either a 
qualified or a simple majority WTO jurisprudence.  The US – Tuna II (Mexico) Case38 
                                                 
33  Collier 2005 users.ox.ac.uk 1423-1449. 
34  Baldwin 2009 onlinelibrary.wiley.com 29. 
35  Pauwelyn 2005 Mich L Rev 2-69. 
36  Osakwe 2011 Minn J Int'l L 365-436. 
37  Tijmes‐Lhl 2009 World Trade Review 432. 
38  WT/DS381/R - US - Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products. 
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dispute gives the impression that consensus is reached when there is the absence of 
sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important party to the concerned 
interest. This has been interpreted to mean that individual participants have veto 
power. However, a number of questions remain unanswered, for example: 
 What amounts to absence of opposition? 
 Who is an important party? 
 What qualifies as 'concerned interest' and by whom? 
 
It is important that consensus decision-making not be reinterpreted as a process 
that must be inclusive and conciliatory. This tempers individual countries' vetoes and 
leaves room for the Chair of a WTO body to declare consensus even if one member 
or a minority of countries formally objects. However, this interpretation of consensus 
works within a very limited scope applicable to the so-called secondary WTO rule-
making bodies (Article IX to XII, Marrakesh Agreement). This limited scope is only 
for organisational matters, like those dealing with the start and conclusion of 
negotiations, interpretations, waivers and accessions. 
 
This will not be applicable to new agreements or amendments to the WTO treaty, 
which are classified as primary rule-making. This means that the WTO should be 
able to conclude a new agreement by "consensus" (as defined above, without 
automatic vetoes). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in article 9(2) 
even refers to a two-thirds majority as the fallback rule for the conclusion of treaties 
in an international conference. 
 
5.2 What is the effect of consensus on the WTO's membership? 
 
The discussion above indicates that consensus was key during the GATT years but 
that its influence has diminished under the WTO. Caution has to be employed so 
that one does not discredit and blame consensus for the challenges affecting the 
WTO. It is also important to examine how its application can compromise the 
integrity of the WTO. For example, consensus may be applied in the WTO without 
paying attention to the geopolitical dimensions of the 153 members. However, 
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where there are fewer participants consensus can easily be reached. This said, it 
would be interesting to know how consensus will feature as a key component of this 
multi-sector cooperation at the WTO. 
 
What can be gathered from this discussion is the importance of consensus in a 
relationship of different member states. There are areas that should not be 
tampered with, especially those regulating the trading system. In the case of the 
WTO these are the most-favoured-nation treatment principles, the binding tariffs 
and articles IX and X of the GATT, that form the legislative framework governing 
decision-making. It is prudent that unanimous consent is required.39 This means the 
whole WTO membership needs to assent to whatever changes or amendments are 
proposed in relation to these provisions regulating the multilateral trading system. 
 
6 The "single package" principle 
 
It is widely believed that all WTO rules must inherently apply to all WTO members 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This would mean that virtually every item of the 
negotiation would be part of a whole and indivisible package and could not be 
agreed on separately.40 This was applicable to the Uruguay Round, where all 
concessions were put in a single treaty. With the establishment of the WTO, the 
"Single Undertaking" also meant that countries wanting to become members of the 
WTO had to accept the entire agreement package in the Uruguay Round as well as 
the associated obligations, without exception.41 However, some of the rules and 
concessions within the treaty are binding only on some countries' special and 
differential treatment (SDT) or waivers. This regime of SDT applied during the 
Uruguay Round is no longer relevant to some members, especially those whose 
economies have grown since then. Furthermore, this approach is not as clear-cut as 
the arrangement in BRICS, where there is a strong feeling and realisation that 
countries like South Africa do not match up with Brazil and India in terms of 
economic and trade performance. There is even talk that South Africa is trying to 
                                                 
39  See Article IX:2 of the World Trade Organisation Agreement (1994). 
40  See WTO Date Unknown www.wto.org. 
41  Wolfe 2009 J Int'l Econ L 835-858. 
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gate-crash the party as an imposter.42 This raises many questions, such as is South 
Africa's recent gross domestic Product (GDP) growth and trade performance worthy 
of being at the party? What has the relative performance of South Africa been in 
recent times? How does this performance rate vis-à-vis BRICS?43 
 
This "single package" approach is even more nuanced in the Doha Round, where 
negotiators adopted the procedural rule that 'nothing is decided until everything is 
decided'. The effect of this procedural rule means that a deal is closed only when all 
elements are agreed upon. It is not about what is in the deal or which binding rules 
are applicable to the specific member states. Developing countries are following a 
different approach, where different sectors have different levels of cooperation. This 
kind of flexibility is missing in the WTO's multilateral system. 
 
A number of questions continue to be raised around the 'single package' theme. For 
example: 
 
 What are the new generation agreements in the WTO going to be? 
 Is variable geometry or flexible multilateral integration applicable?  
 
These questions are relevant in that they seek important answers. Even though 
arrangements like BRICS are a creation outside the WTO, the fact that its members 
are key drivers in multilateral trade is enough to qualify them as creators of a new 
generation of trade regimes. It is inevitable that the BRICS countries will venture 
into agreements that will seek to legitimise their trade relations. In the absence of 
such agreements, these countries will continue to utilise the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism when they face conflict. This has already been experienced when Brazil 
signalled its unhappiness at poultry tariffs imposed by South Africa.44 Brazil had 
threatened to take South Africa to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to contest the 
anti-dumping duties that have been levied on its poultry exports. 
                                                 
42  Sandrey "South Africa's Way Ahead" 33-37.  
43  Sandrey "South Africa's Way Ahead" 33-37. 
44   See Khuzwayo W and Ginindza B, Business Report  'Brazil-SA trade spat avoided'. Available at: 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/brazil-sa-trade-spat-avoided-1.1586850 Accessed 20/01/14. 
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The "single undertaking" approach now threatens the ever-increasing membership of 
the WTO. It forces members to sign up to agreements in areas in which they have 
no capacity to implement their obligations. The 'single undertaking' approach 
resulted in the WTO's falling short of recognising that there was no parity among the 
countries signing up to the Uruguay Round agreements.45 This approach makes it 
impossible to reach agreement because countries are at different levels of economic 
development and follow different approaches in implementing their agendas. The 
diversity of membership demands that a variable geometry or a measure of flexibility 
be employed when dealing with member states as individuals and as a collective. 
Ultimately, the "single package" undertaking at the WTO has created a favourable 
environment for developing countries to create alternative avenues for conducting 
trade. It remains to be seen if the BRICS countries are ready to slow down and give 
up on the gains made during the time of multilateral deadlocks. 
 
7 The WTO as a member-driven organisation 
 
The WTO is typically very distant from the real world. It does not engage actively 
with other actors. The WTO faces heavy criticism from civil society, academics and 
industry.46 This criticism is not just about reaching out to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), it is more about letting NGOs be formidable partners in 
shaping the discourse pertaining to issues that affect trade as well as in shaping 
multilateral trade policy going forward.47 It is important to emphasise that the WTO 
engages the NGOs and reaches out to them very well. The WTO's annual Open 
Forum, for example, includes many NGOs. However, it is necessary to ask what role 
such NGOs play in determining the future of the organisation and its activities. Both 
the WTO's members and the WTO as an organisation should establish better and 
more direct lines of communication with the private sector, consumer organisations 
and sector-specific regulators, agencies and administrators (part of the so-called 
'disaggregated' regulatory state). Regional Trade Agreements seem to have 
                                                 
45  Oxfam 2000 policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk. 
46  Hoekman 2011 www-wds.worldbank.org 1-28. 
47  Piewitt 2010 Journal of World Trade 467-488. 
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successfully addressed this challenge. There is also a high degree of private sector 
involvement in the sectoral cooperation and working groups. 
 
Realigning the diplomacy of trade negotiation by interacting with other actors like 
banks, regulators and international organisations would be ideal, especially after the 
global economic crisis, which has affected global trade flows negatively. The WTO 
has often been blamed for being full of technocrats that know little about rule-
making and how business operates. Examples can be drawn from the complexities of 
legal line-drawing or classifications by technocrats. In this environment, non-state 
actors have a role to play in multilateralism. Their involvement will make deal-
making easy. It is important to have a better appreciation of the role non-state 
actors play in the promotion of trade and other related activities. 
 
8 Special and differential treatment (SDT) for 'developing countries' 
 
Special and differential treatment operates on the basis of lumping all emerging and 
developing economies together into one supposedly homogenous group of 
'developing countries' that need the same kind of treatment because they share 
characteristics, especially in economic development. This is an unfair practice.48 The 
rationale behind the system of SDT is to enable trade-offs through issue linkages 
and to facilitate leverage in negotiations, where such leverage might otherwise not 
exist.49 SDT enables developing countries to apply protectionist trade strategies, 
such as the use of import substitution to promote industrialisation; export subsidies 
to promote exports; and trade controls for balance of payment purposes.50 More 
than 80% of WTO members are "developing countries". Currently the WTO has 
agreed to more than 155 SDT provisions, which form the "development" element of 
the WTO.51 However, one of the major complaints made by developing countries has 
been that SDT is ineffective in its current form.52 This is evident in the language 
                                                 
48  See generally Ghosh 2010 World Trade Review 419‐455. 
49  Low 2011 www.wto.org 71. 
50  Michalapoulos 2000 siteresources.worldbank.org 3. 
51  See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and International Institute for 
Sustainable Development 2003 www.wto.org. 
52  Hoekman Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space 405-424. 
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employed in the provisions and the lack of effective sanctions for failure to adhere to 
the provisions.53 The language is vague and fails to give firm direction on how SDT 
should be applied. Rather, it merely encourages the granting of preferences by 
developed countries to developing partners.54 The Doha Development Agenda had 
given hope to poor countries that they would make strides in eliminating poverty.55 
 
SDT may have been relevant during the formation of the WTO but things have 
changed since then. It was employed as a response to the prevailing development 
orthodoxy among developing countries at the time, where the import-substitution 
industrialisation model was being actively pursued.56 In addition, the status of 
'developing country' is obtained in the WTO by self-selection. This status cannot be 
challenged legally or in any form at the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. 
 
Many WTO members have claimed the "developing country" status. This is despite 
the increase of diversity among members since the formation of the WTO. However, 
can the rest of the developing world be put in the same boat as the BRICS 
countries? It is in the BRICS countries' interest to keep their status as developing 
countries. Furthermore, this position is detrimental to countries that are really 
developing and to least-developed countries (LDCs). Remaining in the developing 
countries group appeals not only to the BRICS countries; small LDCs, too, fear a 
break-up will risk their collective bargaining power. Thus, they cling together in 
coalitions that increase their bargaining power.57 Working together has proved to be 
valuable to these countries, especially in pushing for the removal of agricultural 
subsidies by the developed countries.58 
 
                                                 
53  Dube Way Forward for the WTO 5 
54  Lichtenbaum 2002 Am U Int'l L Rev 1004-1032. 
55  Zedillo "Surviving the Doha Round". 
56  Draper and Khumalo Smoke and Mirrors? 1-4. 
57  Narlikar International Trade 48. 
58  Kwa WTO Members Fight over Developing Countries' Agriculture Markets: An Ominous  
Outcome for the South? Available at: 
http://www.iatp.org/files/WTO_Members_Fight_over_Developing_Countries_2.htm. Accessed  
 20/01/14. 
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However, it is important to also look at the rationale behind the need to relinquish 
the SDT arrangement. To do so would be to spread responsibilities equitably, taking 
differences between countries into account. Discrimination is not only treating similar 
countries differently; it includes treating different countries in the same way.59 A 
similar challenge faces the UN's climate change negotiations. The WTO is not sure 
about whether it should venture into the area of regulating climate change or 
whether the problem should rather be left to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. 
 
The domination of the developed countries has been ameliorated recently, with the 
developing countries no longer allowing the developed countries to make all key 
decisions. It is not enough to just provide developing countries with leverage to be 
able to protect their economies through the special and differential treatment tool.60 
Developing countries were for example at the forefront of the campaign against the 
inclusion of the Singapore issues in the WTO agenda, successfully arguing that to do 
so would be to intrude into domestic policy. 
 
9 The WTO as "hard law" subject to compulsory dispute settlement 
 
The creation of the WTO under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 
1947) came at the height of the move towards the legalisation of world politics. This 
was an age that believed that 'hard law' enforced by binding dispute settlement 
processes was necessarily "better" law.61 At the time the world had emerged from 
two very destructive world wars and the need for a rules-based multilateral system 
was recognised by many. Under GATT, provision was made for rules to ensure that 
states did not renege on their tariff liberalisation commitments.62 However, tariffs 
are no longer a major impediment to international trade. In addition, the current 
environment has proven that 'hard law' administered by dispute settlement can 
actually threaten the flexibility of multilateralism. The hard law characteristic of the 
                                                 
59  Pauwelyn 2005 Mich L Rev 2-69. 
60  Baldwin 2010 www.cepr.org 1-12. 
61  Abbott and Snidal 2000 International Organization 421-456. 
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WTO has made it favourable for loose arrangements like BRICS to prosper. These 
are flexible arrangements that promote intra-regional or bilateral trade where 
economic and political desire drives the process. The BRICS arrangement can easily 
be described as a type of gentlemen's club of emerging economies, where hard law 
scarcely plays a role. There are no rules and no treaty has been signed. Under 
Article XXIV of GATT, the WTO requires that countries that enter into preferential 
arrangements do so using the exceptions provided for under this legal instrument. 
It has been stated that the Doha Round requires flexibility in order for it to be 
resuscitated.63 The WTO should therefore consider creating some agreements that 
are not subject to WTO dispute settlement, or even mere guidelines with flexibility 
for domestic implementation and future adaptation subject to peer review and less 
adversarial monitoring mechanisms. 
 
There are merits to employing soft or informal law in certain circumstances. The 
advantages may be greater and more effective than those that come as a result of 
enforcing compliance with hard law. Many problems in today's networked knowledge 
society, where technologies change rapidly and uncertainty prevails, are increasingly 
difficult to address through the rigidity of traditional treaties and formal dispute 
settlement. Developing countries are well placed to utilise the new capabilities that 
are made possible by modernisation and technological advancements. 
 
Although violations of these norms are not enforceable in WTO dispute settlement, 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body can and have referred to them in the 
interpretation of the WTO treaty. They could also be backed up by Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism-style monitoring with the possible inclusion of the non-state 
actors discussed above. Thus, it is important to note that the consideration and use 
of soft law in multilateralism could bring about changes that could revitalise the 
Doha Round of trade negotiations. 
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10 Challenges facing emerging economies in reforming the multilateral 
system 
 
One of the major findings of this paper is that the multilateral system among 
developing countries, especially in the BRICS coalition, is just a loose arrangement 
whose effect on the multilateral system still need to be established. Are developing 
countries really political and economic powerhouses that can lead the global 
economy out of a recession and guarantee genuine reform? The BRICS coalition has 
often been accused of having conflicting interests and of assuming incoherent 
positions. Are these leading emerging economies ready to share the platform they 
occupy with other, poorer developing economies that make up part of the group of 
developing countries in the WTO? An example could be drawn from agriculture, 
where the interests of food-exporting developing countries such as Brazil are inimical 
to those of net food-importing developing countries; that is, their positions on 
agricultural trade are diametrically opposed.64 African countries, except for South 
Africa, remain commodity suppliers and import value-added products. Thus, it will be 
interesting to see if the BRICS countries have what it takes to compromise in the 
service of the interests of other developing countries. 
 
11 Conclusion 
 
The challenges being experienced by the Doha Round as well as the current global 
economic challenges have led to start questioning the relevance of some of the 
founding principles of the WTO. However, this situation presents an opportunity to 
strengthen the WTO as a trading body.65 All of the principles discussed are 
intrinsically linked to one another. For example "single undertaking" and "consensus" 
require the bundling of agreements and the participation of all parties. SDT and the 
understanding that the WTO is a member-driven institution recognise that all 
members need to make a contribution to the multilateral decision-making process, 
even if they are poor. However, this note attempted to introduce the magnitude of 
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this challenge. The realisation of the usefulness of 'soft law' as against hard law' is 
critical in bringing obligations, legitimacy and certainty to the multilateral trading 
system. This paper concludes that in as much as these principles were instrumental 
in shaping the past and present paradigm of the multilateral trade system, new 
challenges and new environments demand novel ways of dealing with them. This 
new environment has created a breeding ground conducive to the emergence of 
new, informal bilateral arrangements in which emerging economies can find 
common ground in the pursuit of multifaceted cooperation for mutual benefit. As 
developing countries build momentum, especially those making up the BRICS 
configuration, and as they become more and more integrated, it is important that 
the relationship they share should be defined by firm principles. Whether they use 
the entrenched principles of consensus, single undertaking, SDT, member-driven 
and a "hard law" or a "soft law" approach is a matter that requires special 
consideration. However, even though these principles require contextual reform, 
they are undoubtedly important to the multilateral trading system. 
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